The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee. by Riboni, Alessandro & Ruge-Murcia, Francesco
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1406438
The Dynamic (In)e￿ciency of
Monetary Policy by Committee
Alessandro Riboni and Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia￿
December 2007
Abstract
This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is
selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee
members di￿er in their institutional power and, in certain states of nature, they also
di￿er in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for
the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically ine￿cient and inertial
around the previously-agreed instrument value. This model endogenously generates
autocorrelation in the policy variable and helps explain the empirical observation that
the distribution of actual interest rate changes has a mode of zero.
JEL Classi￿cation: E4, E5, D7
Key Words: status-quo bias, policy conservatism, policy inertia, gridlock interval, dy-
namic voting, interest-rate smoothing.
￿Both authors: D￿ epartement de sciences ￿ economiques, Universit￿ e de Montr￿ eal. We thank two anonymous
referees and participants in the conference on New Developments in the Analysis of Monetary Policy and
Institutions at Tel Aviv University (December, 2005), the Meetings of the European Economic Association
(Vienna, 2006), and seminars at the Board of Governors and the Bank of Canada for helpful comments. This
research received the ￿nancial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
Correspondence: Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, D￿ epartement de sciences ￿ economiques, Universit￿ e de Montr￿ eal,
C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-ville, Montr￿ eal (Qu￿ ebec) H3C 3J7, Canada.Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1406438
1 Introduction
This paper studies the dynamic implications of monetary policy making by committee. The
subject matter is important because, in many countries, monetary policy decisions are made
by committees, rather than by one individual alone. For example, Fry et al. (2000) report
that in a sample of 88 central banks, 79 use some form of committee structure to formulate
monetary policy.
In particular, this paper focuses on a two-person committee where heterogenous agents
must select the value of the policy instrument (say, the nominal interest rate) but face
exogenous uncertainty regarding their preferred policies in the future. The committee
members di￿er in two ways. First, agents have di￿erent state-dependent preferences over
policy. There are states of nature where agents do not agree in their preferred instrument
value, and states where they agree. Second, agents di￿er in their institutional role. More
concretely, one agent, the chairman or agenda setter, makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to
the other agent in every period. This assumption captures the idea that chairmen usually
have more power and in￿uence than their peers as a result of additional legal responsibilities,
statutory prerogatives, or prestige. The identity of the chairman and the composition of
the committee are assumed to be ￿xed over time. An important and plausible feature of
the voting game is that the instrument value decided in the previous meeting is the default
option in case the proposal is rejected in the current meeting. Hence, the current status
quo is a state variable.1
In this setup, the ￿rst-best policy (that is, the state-contingent program that a benevolent
social planner would choose) prescribes the policy preferred by both agents in states of agree-
ment and optimal risk-sharing in states of disagreement. However, the politico-economic
equilibrium cannot implement the ￿rst-best policy in the absence of a commitment tech-
nology. Instead, the politico-economic equilibrium features ine￿cient policy choices in all
states of nature. First, in states of agreement, committee members do not select their com-
mon preferred policy. The reason is that forward-looking policy makers realize that current
decisions a￿ect future voting outcomes by changing the default option in the next meeting.
Hence, in choosing the current policy, committee members trade-o￿ the bene￿t of select-
ing their preferred policy for this period and the cost of a￿ecting their bargaining power
in future states of disagreement. Simulations show that this form of \political failure"
1The empirical relevance of this assumption in many policy decisions is discussed in Tsebelis (2002, p.
8). The theoretical literature on bargaining with evolving defaults is scant. Among the few contributions,
see Baron (1996), Baron and Herron (2003), Bullard and Waller (2004), Bernheim et al. (2006) and Fong
(2006). To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst to incorporate preference uncertainty in a model
with dynamic reversion of the status quo.
[1](Besley and Coate, 1998) often implies muted responses to changing economic conditions
and, consequently, provides a rationale for (ine￿cient) policy conservatism.
Second, in states of disagreement, committee decisions are inertial. That is, the chair-
man’s optimal proposal is often the status quo, even when the state of nature has changed.
This result is primarily due to the heterogeneity in policy preferences and to the role of the
status quo as the default option in the voting game. Since the default policy may not be
undesirable for a committee member, in many instances policy changes are not passed (or
proposed). A similar status-quo bias in policy making is derived by Romer and Rosenthal
(1978) in a static model. However, compared to their agenda-setting game, the status-quo
bias in this model gives rise to ine￿ciency. In particular, there is imperfect risk-sharing in
that there are instances where the current policy is (close to) optimal for one policy maker
but very costly for the other (or vice versa). Also, the status-quo bias in this model is not
as severe as in the game in Romer and Rosenthal. In some circumstances, the chairman is
able to change policy even if the default option coincides with the preferred policy of the
other member. This result arises because, in a dynamic setup, committee members smooth
their bargaining power across states and are willing to lower their current utility to increase
their bargaining power in future meetings.
Simulations of our model con￿rm that the policy variable changes less often than the
state of nature and, consequently, the path of the former is smoother than that of the latter.
A similar result whereby committee decision making induces policy smoothing has been
derived by Waller (2000) in a model with partisan central bank appointments and exogenous
electoral outcomes ￿ a la Alesina (1987). In our model, policy smoothing is not sustained
by the strategic appointment of moderate committee members (as in Waller’s model) or by
trigger punishments (as in Alesina’s model), but is instead the result of the voting game
played by the committee. Moreover, in the above literature, policy smoothing is regarded
as welfare increasing because it reduces the uncertainty associated with elections. Thus, a
constant policy rule, irrespective of the identity of the winning party, is bene￿cial to both
parties. In our model, preferred policies are not constant but instead vary over time as the
state of nature changes. As a result, a constant policy is not optimal and policy inertia
moves the economy away from the e￿cient frontier.
In what follows, Section 2 describes the committee and solves a two-state model that
illustrates basic implications of the voting game, Section 3 solves and simulates a more
general multi-state model, Section 4 compares the voting model with an endogenous and a
￿xed default and Section 5 concludes.
[2]2 Two-State Model
This section describes the committee and examines a version of the dynamic voting game
with two states of nature. The two-state model is solved for three horizons, namely ￿ = 1;2
and 1: The ￿nite horizon cases (￿ = 1;2) are solved analytically by backward induction
and the in￿nite horizon case (￿ = 1) is solved numerically. Studying the two-state model
￿rst helps develop the reader’s intuition by illustrating some of our results in the simplest
possible setup.
The committee is composed of two agents with heterogenous preferences: C and P; where
C is the ￿xed chairman.2 In every period, the committee is concerned with selecting the
policy variable xt that takes values in the interval [0;1]: To make this more concrete, think
of the policy variable as the target value of a key nominal interest rate. In each period t,
the payo￿ of policy maker j, for j = C;P, is
Uj(xt;"t) = ￿(xt ￿ rj("t))
2; (1)
where rj("t) is j’s state-dependent preferred policy and "t is an exogenous shock. For
analytical convenience, it is assumed that the probability distribution of "t is discrete. In
this section, it is also assumed that "t can take only two values, "1 and "2: The shock follows
a Markov chain and its transition matrix has elements pki = prob("k j "i) 2 (0;1) with
i;k = 1;2 and
2 P
k=1
pki = 1: Two states of nature are de￿ned by the possible realizations of "t:
When "t = "1, agents C and P disagree in their preferred instrument values with rC("1) = 1
and rP("1) = 0:3 When "t = "2, C and P’s preferences are perfectly aligned meaning that
rC("2) = rP("2) = 1=2.4 The assumption that bliss points are evenly spaced entails no loss
of generality. Each committee member ranks policy sequences according to the expected
2The assumption of a ￿xed agenda setter is made for the sake of realism. For example, in the case of the
United States, the chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee is (by tradition) the chairman of the
Board of Governors, who in turn is appointed by the President for a renewable four-year term. For models
of legislative bargaining where the the agenda setter is randomly selected, see Baron (1996) and Baron and
Ferjohn (1989).
3The converse assumption that rC("1) = 0 and rP("1) = 1 leads to decision rules that are mirror images
of the ones derived here. Hence, the main theoretical implications of the model are robust to using either
version of this assumption.
4For instance in Clarida et al. (1999, p. 1672), the optimal interest rate response to cost-push shocks
depends on a preference parameter while the response to demand shocks depends only on the slope of the
IS curve. Thus, two central bankers with di￿erent in￿ation weights in their loss function but identical
estimates of the slope parameter will agree in their desired interest rate following a cost-push shock but will
disagree following a demand shock.
[3]utility they deliver. The intertemporal utility of member j is








where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor, which is the same for both players.
Note that preferences depend on the policy instrument rather than on policy outcomes
(say, in￿ation and unemployment). This approach has two advantages. First, it makes the
voting game more tractable because otherwise the private sector’s expectations would be a
state variable that has to be validated in a rational expectations equilibrium.5 Second, it
means that the particular economic model that the policy maker believes to be true need
not be speci￿ed. This is important because anecdotal evidence suggests that policy makers
may have di￿erent views about how the economy works depending on their background and
intellectual environment (see Hetzel, 1998, and Romer and Romer, 2004).
Systematic disagreement over policy may arise from the combination of several factors.
First, members may disagree on the \correct" economic model or, if they share a common
model, disagree on the empirical estimates of its parameters. For example, members may
have di￿erent opinions regarding the true natural unemployment rate or the sacri￿ce ratio.
Second, members may di￿er in their information sets or in the weights they associate to
each piece of information. Finally, members may di￿er in their preferences over economic
outcomes. For example, they may attach a larger relative weight to in￿ation vis ￿ a vis un-
employment stabilization or give proportionally more importance to the e￿ects of monetary
policy decisions on a geographical region or economic sector.6
Before discussing how the committee makes decisions, we derive the benchmark ￿rst best
that an utilitarian social planner would choose. Let x￿
t("i) denote the optimal policy when




￿E (uC(x1;:::;x￿)) + (1 ￿ ￿)E (uP(x1;:::;x￿));
5This is a non-trivial ￿xed point to solve for. The strategy of the private sector depends on the expected
voting outcome, but the outcome of the voting game depends on the expectations of the private sector in two
ways: 1) directly, because expected in￿ation a￿ects policy makers’ utilities; and 2) indirectly by changing
the default payo￿, since the real interest rate in case of disagreement is the di￿erence between the nominal
status quo policy and expected in￿ation. For now, we leave this extension to future research.
6In the empirical literature, Belden (1989), Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990), and Gildea (1992) ￿nd that
district bank presidents tend to prefer tighter monetary policy than members of the Board of Governors in the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2007a) ￿nd systematic heterogeneity
in the reaction functions of members of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. This
heterogeneity appears to be related to the nature of the membership and individual career background.
Meade and Sheets (2005) report evidence that FOMC district bank presidents react to regional shocks.
Chappell et al. (2005, ch. 6.3) document the division within the FOMC between Keynesian and Monetarist
members during Arthur Burns’ chairmanship.
[4]where ￿ and (1 ￿ ￿); with 0 6 ￿ 6 1, are, respectively, the weights assigned to C and P in
the planner’s social welfare function. Obviously, in the state of agreement x￿
t("1) = 1=2: In










t("2) = ￿: When the utilities of C and P are equally weighted, the ￿rst best in the
state of disagreement coincides with 1=2: If we let ￿ vary between 0 and 1, any instrument
value in the interval [0;1] is ￿rst-best since no member can be made strictly better o￿ without
making the other member strictly worse o￿.7
Let qt 2 [0;1] denote the status quo at time t. The committee decides policies sequentially
with the following timing. First, the current realization of the shock is observed. Then, the
chairman makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal xt 2 [0;1]: If the proposal is rejected by P,
then the status quo persists until the next period. If the proposal is accepted, then xt is
implemented and becomes the new status quo for the voting game at time t+1. Note that
the committee votes on the current policy only and there are no multi-period proposals.8
The assumption that the chairman makes take-it-or-leave-it proposals to the committee is
not meant to be a literal description of how monetary committees actually work. Instead,
it is a modeling device that captures the idea that chairmen usually have more power and
in￿uence than their peers.
Institutional evidence indicates that chairmen have some control over the agenda. For
example, in many monetary policy committees, the chairman is traditionally the one who
formulates the proposal to be voted on. This is the case, for example, in the committees of
the Bank of England, the Norges Bank, Reserve Bank of Australia, the Swedish Riksbank,
and the U.S. Federal Reserve (see Meier, 2007).9 Anecdotal evidence, mostly from former
members of the FOMC, shows the preponderant role of the chairman in the decision making
process. For instance, Alan Blinder (2004, p. 47) writes that \each member other than
Alan Greenspan has had only one real choice when the roll was called: whether to go on
record as supporting or opposing the chairman’s recommendation, which will prevail in any
7The ￿rst best could also be implemented in a politico-economic equilibrium if one were to assume that
the chairman is able to propose a credible state-contingent plan for all future periods in the initial period.
Such proposals are ruled out here on the grounds of realism.
8In some cases, monetary policy committees do discuss future policy decisions; think, for example, of the
bias statement following FOMC meetings which signals the future policy stance. However, it is apparent
that the FOMC is not necessarily bound to pursue that policy in the future. For example, statements usually
include a escape clause like: "Nonetheless, the Committee will respond to changes in economic prospects as
needed to ful￿ll its obligation to maintain price stability" (see the press release on 10 November 2004).
9Chappell et al. (2005, p. 128) point out that \at almost every meeting in our sample, Greenspan spoke
￿rst, o￿ered a proposal, and defended it."
[5]case," Laurence Meyer (2004, p. 50) mentions \the chairman’s disproportionate in￿uence
on FOMC decisions," and Sherman Maisel (1973, p. 124) remarks that \the in￿uence of
the Chairman is indeed great." Moreover, as a consequence of the agenda-setting power by
the chairman, the ￿nal voting outcome may sometimes be di￿erent from the policy favored
by a majority of members.10 On the other hand, anecdotal evidence also indicates that
the chairman is not the single decision maker in monetary policy committees. Maisel (p.
124) and Meyer (p. 52) note, respectively, that the Chairman \does not make policy alone"
and \does not necessarily always get his way." Similar views are also expressed by Blinder
(2007) who argues that the chairman’s proposal also re￿ects the opinions expressed by other
committee members.
The problem of the chairman can be formulated recursively with the current status quo
and the current shock as states variables. In each period t, the proposal strategy GC;t(qt;"i)










for i = 1;2. In words, C proposes the policy xt that maximizes his lifetime utility from
among those that are acceptable to P.11 We assume that P accepts a proposal whenever the
current utility from the proposal plus the continuation value of moving to the next period
with a new status quo is higher than or equal to keeping the status quo and moving to
the next period with the current status quo. The set of acceptable policies is denoted by

















for i = 1;2: Note that the chairman’s proposals will never be rejected in equilibrium.12 This
implication is in line with historical records from the FOMC which show that a chairman’s
10Blinder (2004, p. 47) cites two instances where this appears to have been true for the FOMC. First,
transcripts for the meeting on 4 February 1994 indicate that most members wanted to raise the Federal
Funds rate by 50 basis points, while Greenspan wanted a 25 point increase. Nonetheless, the committee
eventually passed Greenspan’s preferred policy. Second, Blinder reports the general opinion that in the late
1990s Greenspan was able to maintain the status quo although most committee members were in favor of
an interest rate increase.
11On the basis of FOMC transcripts for the period 1987 to 1996, Chappell et al. (2005, p. 186) conclude
that \there are at least suggestions that Greenspan’s proposals were crafted with knowledge of what other
members might ￿nd acceptable."
12Proposing a policy outside the acceptance set is equivalent to proposing the status quo, which is always
accepted.
[6]recommendation has never been voted down by the committee (see, Chappell et al., 2005).13
As a solution concept, we adopt Markov perfection. Informally, in a Markov-perfect equi-
librium i) the proposal rules fGC;tg
￿





t=1 are optimal given that fGC;tg
￿
t=1 describe what would happen if the current
proposal were rejected.
Finally, note that unanimity is required for a policy change only because we are consider-
ing a two-person committee. Appendix B shows that the voting outcome in our model would
be identical to the one that we would obtain in a committee with n + 1 members where P
occupies the role of the median and a simple majority is required to pass a proposal. This
result is due to the fact that in a larger committee, the equilibrium outcome would only
depend on the preferences of two key players, namely the median and the chairman. Con-
sequently, the voting outcome would not be a￿ected by either i) an increase of the size of
the committee that leaves unchanged the identity of the median or ii) a radicalization of the
preferences of all members other than the median and the chairman.
2.1 Finite Horizon with ￿=1
Consider the voting game described above with ￿nite horizon ￿ = 1. Absent any dynamics,
the solution is similar to that of the agenda-setting game studied by Romer and Rosenthal
(1978). The chairman’s proposal strategy is depicted in the ￿rst column of Figure 1 as a
function of the status quo q￿ for each possible realization of "￿: Proposals on the 45 degree
line are the status quo.
First, suppose that "1 occurs. In this case, the chairman proposes the status quo for any
q￿ 2 [0;1]: The reason is that P would not accept any proposal x￿ 2 (q￿;1] that gives C
higher utility than q￿, and C would not propose any x￿ 2 [0;q￿) that gives him lower utility
than q￿. Since the proposal strategy is independent of the values of ￿;p11 and p22; it follows
that policy inertia arises in this case only as a result of the heterogeneity among committee
members. Now, suppose that "2 occurs and both members agree that 1=2 is the optimal
value of the policy instrument. In this case, the chairman proposes 1=2 starting from any
status quo. Notice that the outcome of this static game coincides with the ￿rst best.
13This observation is also generally true for the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank England. The
only exception (out of 108 meetings) is the policy decision on 4 August 2005 when the Governor was outvoted
4 to 5 in favor of an interest rate cut of 25 basis points.
[7]2.2 Finite Horizon with ￿=2
Suppose now that the horizon is ￿ = 2. The equilibrium of this two-period version of the
model is solved backwards for t = ￿;￿ ￿ 1. The proposal strategies in the ￿nal period
￿ are those derived in Section 2.1. The proposal strategies at time ￿ ￿ 1 are derived in
Proposition 1 below. In order to develop the reader’s intuition, these strategies are depicted
in the second column of Figure 1 in the special case where ￿ = 0:5; p11 = 0:8 and p22 = 0:5:
These probabilities correspond approximately to those computed using the voting records of
the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England from June 1997 to January
2005.14
Proposition 1. Let ￿ = 2: For all q￿￿1 2 [0;1] the proposal rules at time ￿ ￿1 when "1 and






y; for q￿￿1 2 [0;2z ￿ y]; where y = (1=2 + ￿p12)=(1 + ￿p12);
2z ￿ q; for q￿￿1 2 (2z ￿ y;z); where z = (1=2)=(1 + ￿p12);
q; for q￿￿1 2 [z;y];
y; for q￿￿1 2 (y;1]:
:
Proof: See Appendix A.
Note that the decision rules in period ￿ ￿ 1 converge to those in period ￿ as ￿ ! 0
(committee members attach no weight to future payo￿s) or p12 ! 0 (the probability of
disagreement tends to zero): in either case y;z ! 1=2.
We now comment on the policy rules just derived. When "1 occurs and committee
members disagree on the optimal instrument value, the proposal at time ￿ ￿ 1 is the status
quo. Thus, in the state of disagreement the entire policy space [0;1] is a gridlock interval.
If the status quo falls within this interval, policy changes are blocked by either member
of the committee. The status-quo bias originates from the opposite preferences of the
two players. In this case, there is no Pareto-improving policy change and the political
equilibrium is e￿cient according to the standard economic de￿nition. To see this, pick any
q￿￿1 2 [0;1] and note that any policy choice to the right (left) of q￿￿1 would reduce P’s (C’s)
14The voting records contain information on: the date of the meeting; the policy decision; the names
of members in favor of the decision; and the names and preferred policy options of dissenting members.
The probabilities are computed as follows. A meeting where the policy decision is adopted unanimously
is treated as one where all committee members agree in their preferred instrument value, meaning that in
terms of our model "t = "2: A meeting with at least one dissenting individual is treated as one where
committee members disagree in their preferred instrument value, meaning that "t = "1: Then, p11 (p22)
is computed as the number of observations where members disagree (agree) in two consecutive meetings
divided by the number of observations where members disagree (agree) in the ￿rst of these two meetings.
Since the mapping from the voting records to the model is clearly imperfect, the policy rules in Figure 2 are
best interpreted as illustrative only.
[8]utility. Thus, for the two-state model, the committee implements the ￿rst-best in the state
of disagreement.15
When "2 occurs, committee members agree that 1=2 is the optimal instrument value to-
day. If monetary policy were decided by C alone, the instrument value would be adjusted to
1=2. Instead, Proposition 1 shows that the proposal at time ￿￿1 is generically di￿erent from
the ￿rst-best policy 1=2. For example, when q￿￿1 2 [y;1] the chairman adjusts the current
policy only to y, which is larger than 1=2: This result is due to the non-zero probability of
disagreement in the next meeting. The chairman trades o￿ the bene￿t of moving towards
the ideal point 1=2 and the cost of having a worse status quo should "1 occur in the next
period. In particular, the chairman realizes that any policy change that is implemented in
the current period will stay in place in the next period should "1 occur. The interval of
status quo policies where policy change is not possible (i.e., the gridlock interval) is [z;y].
Note that policies z and y correspond to the peaks of the two-period expected utility of
member P and C, respectively. If q￿￿1 2 [z;y], P would veto any increase of the instrument
value towards y and proposing the status quo is then the best option for the chairman. A
policy change can only occur when the status quo is su￿ciently extreme. In particular,
when q￿￿1 falls in the interval [0;z), the chairman proposes 2z ￿q￿￿1; which is the re￿ection
point of q￿￿1 with respect to z. This proposal is the closest policy to y among the ones that
are acceptable by P: When instead q￿￿1 2 (y;1], the chairman is able to o￿er and pass a
proposal that coincides with his ideal point y: Note that the width of the gridlock interval
[z;y] is increasing in the conditional probability of future disagreement p12 and decreasing
in the discount rate.
To see why committee decision-making is dynamically ine￿cient, consider, for instance,
the case where q￿￿1 = y: Rather than staying in y; as established in Proposition 1, a Pareto-
improving choice would be moving to 1=2 today and going back to y in the next period should
"1 occur. However, this policy requires commitment. Absent commitment, after the default
policy has changed to 1=2, it is not optimal for P to allow C to return to y. Consequently,
a policy change to 1=2 will not be implemented by the committee. Similar polices that
Pareto-improve upon those in Proposition 1 can be constructed for all status quo in [0;1]
except for f1=2;2z ￿ 1=2g: (In these two cases, committee decision making implements the
￿rst-best because the proposal coincides with 1=2.) Hence, this simple two-state, two-period
model illustrates the fact that committee decision making with an endogenous status quo
may be ine￿cient.
15Section 3 below shows that this result is not robust to increasing the number of shock realizations and,
consequently, in the multi-state version of the model, the politico-economic equilibrium is ine￿cient in all
states.
[9]The model has positive implications concerning the size of the policy change approved
by the committee compared with the one a single central banker would choose. In what
follows, policy conservatism (overshooting) refers to a situation where the committee changes
policy by less (more) than C as a single banker would. In the state of disagreement, the
committee does not change the instrument value for any initial status quo while the single
banker would change it to 1 regardless of the status quo. In the state of agreement, when
the status quo falls in the interval (2z ￿ 1=2;1], with 2z ￿ 1=2 the re￿ection point of 1=2
with respect to z; the policy change approved by the committee is jq￿￿1 ￿ xtj: This change
is smaller than jq￿￿1 ￿ 1=2j which is the adjustment that a single central banker would
implement. In the special case where q￿￿1 = 2z ￿ 1=2, both the committee and single
banker change the instrument value by the same amount. However, if the initial status
quo belongs to the interval [0;2z ￿ 1=2), the committee overshoots 1=2 and changes the
instrument value by more that a single banker would. The reason is that for a su￿ciently
low status quo, C has enough leverage to propose policies that are larger than 1=2 and closer
to his ideal point y: Thus, overshooting is just another manifestation of dynamic ine￿ciency.
By inspecting the second column of Figure 1, it is clear that the interval of status quo
policies where overshooting arises, [0;2z ￿ 1=2), is much smaller than the interval where
policy conservatism arises, (2z ￿ 1=2;1]. Since overshooting may be a possible outcome
of committee decision making, its quantitative importance is examined below by means of
simulations (see Section 3.2).
It is instructive to consider the implications for monetary policy if instead, as in much
of the political economy literature, we were using a median voter approach. In that case,
the policy outcome in each meeting would coincide with the interest rate preferred by the
median and would be independent from the location of the status quo and from the identity
of the chairman. Since the equilibrium outcome in the next period is uniquely pinned down
and is not a￿ected by current decisions, there would be no dynamic link across periods and,
consequently, the committee would not adjust interest rates in a cautious manner whenever
the policy preferences of all members are aligned.
2.3 In￿nite Horizon
Consider now the voting game in the case where the horizon is in￿nite.16 Because ￿nding the
analytical solution to the in￿nite-horizon game is not trivial, we employ instead a numerical
algorithm to ￿nd the stationary decision rules. The procedure builds on the projection
16This is equivalent to assume that, at the end of a ￿nite term in o￿ce, a committee member is replaced
by another policy maker with the same preferences and that members care about policy outcomes that occur
after their mandates.
[10]method employed by Judd (1998) to study the Bellman equation of the stochastic growth
model, and works by backward induction exploiting the observation that the chairman’s
problem is a constrained maximization which can be solved numerically using standard hill-
climbing methods. See Appendix C for a detailed description of the algorithm.
The chairman’s stationary decision rules are plotted in the third column of Figure 1.
When "t = "1 and both members disagree, the chairman simply proposes the status quo.
As in the ￿nite horizon model, the gridlock interval is equal to the entire policy space [0;1]:
When "t = "2; the proposal strategy is qualitatively similar to that derived analytically in
Proposition 1 for the horizon ￿ = 2. However, the set of status quo for which the chairman
does not propose a policy change is larger and is now equal to the interval [v;w], with
w < z < y < v: For example, when the status quo is su￿ciently high the committee moves
to v when "2 occurs. The di￿erence between the proposed policy and the current bliss point
is then larger. Intuitively, as we increase the periods left before the end of the game, the
chairman is more cautious in moving towards 1=2 because he is more likely to be constrained
as a result of the current choice. Note that today’s decision has an e￿ect on future outcomes
only when "1 occurs in the next period, two periods in a row, three periods in a row, etc.
When there are more periods left before the end of the game, the sum of the probabilities
associated with these events is quantitatively larger.
3 Multi-State Model
This section solves the dynamic voting game in the more general case where the number of
possible shock realizations is larger than two. This extension is important for two reasons.
First, it shows that the e￿cient outcome in the state of disagreement reported in Section 2
is not robust to increasing the number of shock realizations and, consequently, committee
policy choices may be ine￿cient in all states. Second, the two-state model features a strong
form of policy inertia in the form of the absorbing region [w;v] and, consequently, it does
not permit the derivation of time series implications.17 In what follows, the chairman’s
proposal strategies are computed, and then policy decisions by the committee are simulated
for a sample of sequential meetings.
3.1 Proposal Strategies
Assume that the shock "t can take I discrete values, "i for i = 1;2;::: ;I: De￿ne S =
f"1;"2;::: ;"Ig: As before, the shock follows a Markov chain and its I ￿I transition matrix
17To see this, note that as soon as "2 occurs, the successful proposal will be xt 2 [w;v] with xt = qt 2 [w;v]
thereafter.
[11]has elements pki = prob("k j "i) 2 (0;1) that satisfy
I P
k=1
pki = 1: The shock "t shifts the
agents’ preferred policies over a policy set X = [0;1]: The timing and other features of the




proposal strategy GC;t(qt;"t) solves the dynamic programming problem
VC;t(qt;"t) = max
xt2At(qt;"t)
UC(xt;"t) + ￿EtVC;t+1(xt;"t+1): (4)
For concreteness, we focus on the case where I = 6 and maintain the convention that
committee members agree in the even states and disagree in the odd states of nature. The
bliss points of P (C) in states 1 through 6 are, respectively, 0(1=2); 1=4(1=4); 1=4(3=4);
1=2(1=2); 1=2(1); and 3=4(3=4):
We now characterize the ￿rst-best policy for the multi-state version of the model. As
before, x￿
t("i) denotes the ￿rst-best policy when shock i occurs. Clearly, x￿
t("2) = 1=4;
x￿
t("4) = 1=2, and x￿
t("6) = 3=4: Regarding the optimal policies in the states of disagreement,



















That is, the ratio of marginal utilities must be equalized across all states of disagreement.
The above condition implies that x￿
t("1) = ￿=2; x￿
t("3) = ￿3=4 + (1 ￿ ￿)=4 and x￿
t("5) =
￿+(1￿￿)=2: As before, the ￿rst-best depends on the state of the economy only and not on
the time index t. Since the ideal points are equally spaced, condition (5) implies that in all




t("5)￿1=2. To see, for example, that x￿
t("1) = x￿
t("3)￿1=4;
suppose, on the contrary, that x￿
t("1) < x￿
t("3) ￿ 1=4 and note that in this case both policy
makers could augment their payo￿ by increasing x￿
t("1) and lowering x￿
t("3): However, this
Pareto improving policy change requires commitment. Absent commitment, C will not, in
general, abide by his promises after P concedes to change the interest rate. Results below
show that the committee does not implement the ￿rst-best policy. First of all, the policy in
the state of agreement will be di￿erent from the unanimously preferred policy. Moreover,
in the states of disagreement condition (5) will not be satis￿ed: there are instances where
the current policy is (close to) optimal for one policy maker but very costly for the other (or
vice versa).
The stationary decision rules of the dynamic voting game are solved for using the al-
gorithm described in Appendix C. Since the chairman’s proposal strategies depend on the
matrix of transition probabilities, we conducted extensive experiments with various parame-
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3=5 1=5 0 0 0 0
1=5 3=5 1=5 0 0 0
1=5 1=5 3=5 1=5 0 0
0 0 1=5 3=5 1=5 1=5
0 0 0 1=5 3=5 1=5
0 0 0 0 1=5 3=5
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1=6 1=6 1=6 1=6 1=6 1=6
1=6 1=6 1=6 1=6 1=6 1=6
1=6 1=6 1=6 1=6 1=6 1=6
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1=6 1=6 1=6 1=6 1=6 1=6
1=6 1=6 1=6 1=6 1=6 1=6
3
7 7
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:
Matrix A was deliberately designed to represent the idea that preferred policies evolve slowly
over time as new information about business cycle and in￿ation variables becomes available.
Matrix B is used to study committee decision making when the states of nature are serially
uncorrelated. Decision rules are respectively plotted in the ￿rst and second column of Figure
2. Proposals on the 45 degree line are the status quo (that is, xt = qt).
The following implications for committee decision making can be drawn from Figure
2. First, consider the proposal rules in states of agreement. As before, the chairman
proposes instrument values di￿erent from 1=4;1=2 and 3=4 in states 2;4 and 6, respectively,
even though both members agree that these are their current preferred policy options. The
intuition for this result is the same as in the two-state model, namely that in a dynamic setup,
committee members face a trade-o￿ between the current bene￿t of choosing their preferred
policy and the possible cost of reducing their bargaining power in future meetings. In most
cases, the committee partially adjust to shocks that align preferences and, consequently,
policy changes are typically smaller than the optimal ones.
Now consider the proposal rules in states of disagreement. In these cases, there is local
policy inertia around previously agreed on decisions. To see this, consider the following
example. Starting from state "t = "2 and instrument value 1=4, suppose there is a \small"
change in the state of nature, meaning to either of the adjacent states "t = "1 or "3: In these
states, members disagree on their preferred instrument value but the chairman’s decision
rule still implies xt = 1=4. Now, suppose there is a \large" change in the state of nature,
meaning to "t = "4;"5 or "6: Note that in these cases the proposal will be di￿erent from
the status quo regardless of whether members agree in their desired instrument value or
not. An implication of local inertia is that the relation between changes in the state of
nature and in policy is nonlinear. In particular, small changes in the state of nature are
less likely to produce policy changes compared with larger ones. Empirically, this would
mean, for example, that small variations in the rates of in￿ation and unemployment are less
18The relatively low value of ￿ is used to show that dynamic ine￿ciency arises in the multi-state version
of the model even when the future is heavily discounted. Alesina (1987) argues that policy makers’ e￿ective
discount rates may be low because reappointment probabilities are less than one. Results from unreported
experiments are available from the corresponding author upon request.
[13]likely to result in a change in the key nominal interest rate, compared with large movements
in these variables.19 In contrast, the standard model with a single central banker, which
underlies the derivation of the linear Taylor rule, predicts a proportional change in the policy
instrument for any change in in￿ation and unemployment regardless of their size.
Note that P allows a policy change in the (odd) states of nature where there is disagree-
ment, even when the current default coincides with his preferred policy. For example, when
q = 0 and "t = "1 occurs, the committee chooses an instrument value closer to 1=2. When
the default coincides with his preferred policy, P has signi￿cant bargaining power in the cur-
rent period and, consequently, is willing to accept a policy change to increase his bargaining
power in future meetings. (Notice that were policy xt = 0 to remain the default and should
"5 occur next period, P would enter the next meeting with very low bargaining power.) This
result is not present in the static agenda-setting game of Romer and Rosenthal (1978). It can
only be obtained in a dynamic setup where agents have an incentive to smooth their bargain-
ing power across states by choosing the default for the next meeting.20 This opportunity
is valuable because agents are risk-averse. In absence of commitment, agents strategically
modify the (endogenous) default in order to better share risk across states. Clearly, this
instrument is imperfect: compared to what is prescribed by the ￿rst-best, risk-sharing is
not optimal (i.e., the politico-economic equilibrium fails to satisfy the e￿ciency condition
in states of disagreement as well). In some states, one of the two policy makers obtains a
high payo￿ while the other su￿ers a large loss; in some other states, the situation may be
reversed. Consequently, there is room for better risk-sharing among committee members.
3.2 Simulations
This section simulates committee decision making using an arti￿cial sample of sequential
meetings under the multi-state voting model examined above. This exercise is important
because it reveals the proposal strategies that are implemented in practice and permits the
derivation of time series implications.
A series of 200 realizations of the shock "t were generated using each transition probability
matrix (whether A or B). Then, the outcome of the voting game was found using the
chairman’s proposal strategies in Figure 2. The simulated series of "t and xt are plotted in
Figure 3. Notice that there is policy smoothing in the sense that the policy variable changes
less often than the state of nature. That is, there are many instances where nature changes
19Eij￿nger, Schaling and Verhagen (1999) and Guthrie and Wright (2004) construct models for a single
central banker that generate a similar prediction in the form of an inaction range around the previous policy
choice, but inertia is the result of unspeci￿ed costs for policy changes.
20This result is also present in Baron (1996) and Bullard and Waller (2004).
[14]but the value of the policy variable remains the same. Also, notice that the ergodic process
of the policy variable involves a ￿nite number of realizations but they do not correspond to
the agreement values (1=4;1=2; and 3=4) because of dynamic ine￿ciency. Earlier research
by Alesina (1987) and Waller (2000) also ￿nds that policy may display less variance when
decisions are made through committees than when they are made by a single individual.
However, in this model, policy xt is not sustained by the strategic appointment of moderate
committee members (as in Waller’s model) or by trigger punishments (as in Alesina’s model),
but by the voting game played by the heterogenous committee.
From the simulated series, it is possible to construct the unconditional distribution of
￿xt in Figure 4.21 From this Figure, it is clear that the most common policy decision by
the committee is to set ￿xt = 0 despite the fact that the state of nature has changed.22
This result is due to the local inertia implied by the optimal decision rules of committee
members. This prediction of the voting model is in line with observations of actual policy
decisions. For example, Figure 5 plots the unconditional distribution of changes in the
target value of the key interest rate in four central banks: the U.S. Federal Reserve, the
European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Canada.23 Notice that in
the data, the unconditional distribution of interest rate changes also has a mode equal to
zero.
It is important to compare this implication with the one obtained when monetary policy
is determined by a single individual, say C: Absent a committee, C’s decision rule involves
changing the policy variable to his preferred value whenever there is a change in the state of
nature. The histograms for this case are plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 4 and show
that, in contrast with the data, the outcome ￿xt = 0 is relatively infrequent.
Although overshooting is a possibility in our model, we ￿nd that policy conservatism is
by far the most common outcome. Under Matrix A, the size of ￿xt is always smaller when
decisions are made by the committee rather than by C alone, while under Matrix B, it is so
80 per cent of the times.24
21In order to get a more accurate picture of the distribution, these histograms were constructed using
simulations of 10000 observations.
22Because the transition matrix has a built-in inertia when the diagonal elements are non-zero and in
order not to overstate the policy inertia predicted by the voting game, the histograms are plotted using only
observations where there is a change in the state of nature.
23The interest rates are the Federal Funds Rate, the Rate for Main Re￿nancing Operations, the Repo Rate,
and the Overnight Rate, respectively. The samples used to construct these histograms start in August 1987,
January 1999, June 1997, and December 2000, respectively, and end in May 2006 in all cases. For the
Federal Reserve, the data sources are Chappell et al. (2005) and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
For the other central banks, the data were collected by the authors using o￿cial press releases.
24Looking at the policy rules in Figure 2, an example of overshooting under Matrix B is the following.
Starting in state "t = "2 and with a status quo larger than 1=4; note that the chairman proposes a policy less
[15]Figure 6 plots the sample autocorrelation of the policy variable in the model and in the
key interest rate from four central banks. First, note that the model endogenously generates
positive autocorrelation in the policy variable even when the states of nature are not serially
correlated (Matrix B). The reason is simply that, since the status quo is a state variable,
current and lagged instrument values are linked through the solution of the chairman’s
dynamic optimization problem. Second, when the states of nature are persistent (Matrix A),
then the predicted autocorrelation may approach that observed in actual data.25 In contrast,
the standard model with a single central banker, used to derive the Taylor rule, generates
interest rate autocorrelation only from the serial correlation of in￿ation, unemployment,
and/or exogenous disturbances. Since interest rates are highly autocorrelated in the data,
the empirical analysis of Taylor rules usually involves the addition of lagged interest rates
to the theoretical relation.26
4 Comparing Monetary Policy Institutions
This paper shows the existence of a political failure in monetary policy making by com-
mittee. However, the fact that a ￿ctional social planner can improve upon committees is
no reason to conclude that this institutional arrangement is ine￿cient. In the real world,
the only fair comparison is among political equilibria that can be obtained in the class of
available institutions.27 In order to conclude that a given institution is ine￿cient, one must
show that there exists another institution that increases the utilities of both policy makers.
Unfortunately, this question cannot be answered in a de￿nitive way because, for obvious
reasons, the set of feasible institutions cannot be fully characterized.28
In this section, we consider an alternative institutional arrangement that is identical to the
one we have discussed so far, except for the fact that the default policy is ￿xed. This shuts
down the dynamic link between periods and eliminates the rationale for not implementing
the preferred policy in the even states of nature. Figure 7 shows the stationary policy
than 1=4, while the single central banker would have adopted 1=4. The reason why we observe overshooting
with matrix B, but not with matrix A, is the following. The rationale for overshooting and proposing a
policy less than 1=4 is to have more leverage should "t = "5 occur and get closer to the ideal point 1. The
cost of overshooting is that the chairman is worse o￿ if shock "1 occurs, because the agenda setter is stuck
with a policy lower than 1=4, when his ideal instrument value is 1=2. Since p52 = 0 in matrix A; the expected
cost of overshooting is larger, and, consequently, overshooting does not occur in equilibrium.
25English et al. (2003) reports evidence that the autocorrelation in the U.S. Federal Funds Rate is the
result of both policy inertia and shock persistence.
26See, for example, Clarida et al., (2000). An exception is Woodford (2003) where a motive for interest-rate
smoothing is explicitly introduced into the central bank’s objective function.
27For a discussion along the same lines, see Besley and Coate (1998, Section IV).
28A recent contribution that analyses alternative institutional arrangements for monetary policy is Bullard
and Waller (2004)
[16]rules under di￿erent defaults. These policy rules do not depend on either the status quo or
the matrix of transition probabilities. That is, when plotted as a function of qt, they are
horizontal lines and are the same for any transition matrix. The optimal proposal in the
even states of nature is the preferred bliss point for any ￿xed default, but in the odd states
it crucially depends on the location of the default. Table 1 reports the ex-ante (average)
payo￿ for each committee member under three alternative institutions: i) a committee with
an evolving default; ii) a committee with a ￿xed default; and iii) full delegation to C.29
Table 1 shows that a redistribution of utilities across members is obtained by varying
the ￿xed default. Note that the \average" preferred policies in the states of disagreement
for P and C are, respectively, 1=4 and 3=4: This is why P (C) obtains a high payo￿ when
1=4 (3=4) is the ￿xed default. However, the best ￿xed default for the chairman is policy 1.
The reason is that this default always gives P a lower payo￿ than C’s ideal point. Thus, the
chairman has enough bargaining power to propose his preferred point in all states of nature.
Having a committee with a ￿xed default at 1 is therefore equivalent to an institution where
C is the single central banker (see the last column in Table 1). Note that while having
a ￿xed default eliminates the dynamic ine￿ciency in the states of agreement, it does not
implement the e￿cient outcome in the states of disagreement. To see this, suppose, for
example, that the ￿xed default is 1=2: Then, the committee selects 1=2 whenever "t = "1
or "t = "5 occur. This outcome is clearly ine￿cient because the utility of both committee
members would increase by choosing a policy between the values preferred by P and C. In
other words, there is ine￿cient risk sharing between P and C when the default is ￿xed.
This source of ine￿ciency is also present in the model with an endogenous default, but it is
less severe. The reason is that, when the default is endogenous, committee members can
smooth their bargaining power across states of natures and, consequently, insure themselves
against the eventuality of having little bargaining power in the next meeting.
Now, compare the average payo￿s under committees with endogenous and ￿xed defaults.
Clearly, an endogenous default lowers the average payo￿ to both members in the even states
compared with a ￿xed default because the policy preferred by both members is not imple-
mented. However, Table 1 shows that starting with an endogenous default, the committee
would not agree on amending the institution because any choice of ￿xed default would lower
the ex-ante utility of one of the policy makers. Table 1 also shows that, when the default is
endogenous, C obtains a larger share of the surplus when the transition matrix is B rather
29This comparison is meant to be suggestive only. The stylized nature of the model developed here
prevents us from assessing more in detail the potential social welfare implications of committee decision-
making, as well as the empirical relevance of dynamic ine￿ciency. We intend to take up these issues in
future work.
[17]than A. This is so because the optimal policy changes more drastically when shocks follow
Matrix B: Since the preferred policy in each period is more likely to be far from the previous
policy, the chairman has more leverage in proposing his preferred instrument value.
Regarding the variance of policy decisions under these institutions, note that a committee
with an endogenous status quo generally lowers the variance of both xt and ￿xt compared
with a single central banker and a committee with a ￿xed default (except when the default
is 1=2). This result is a consequence of the local policy inertia introduced by the endogenous
status quo.
The absence of an institution that Pareto-dominates an arrangement with an endogenous
default can explain its endurance, but it cannot explain why this institutional feature is
observed so often in practice.30 To answer this question, Riboni (2004) shows that, in a
model without uncertainty, an endogenous default works as a commitment device and makes
credibility problems less severe.
5 Discussion and Summary
This model is a stylized, rather than a literal, description of actual monetary policy com-
mittees. In particular, one dimension in which our model di￿ers from actual committees
is that in practice terms of o￿ce are often staggered. For instance, the terms of the seven
members of the Board of Governors of the FOMC last 14 years and are staggered so that
one term expires on each even-numbered year.31 To study the consequences of staggered
terms, Appendix D considers a version of our model that combines ￿nite terms with stag-
gered membership. Thus, members di￿er not only in their period utility, but also according
to the number of periods remaining until the end of their term. To make the set up more
tractable, it is assumed that terms last two periods. At each point in time, the committee
consists of a junior member, whose term has just began, and a senior member, who is at the
end of his term.32 Proposals are always made by the senior member, who plays the role of
chairman. Results show complete gridlock in the state of disagreement and somewhat less
inertia in the state of agreement compared to the model in Section 2.2. The latter result is
30On this point, see Tsebelis (2002, p. 8). Rasch (2000) identi￿es countries where an evolving default is
part of the formal rules in legislative decision making.
31Committees with ￿nite and staggered terms have been studied by Waller (2000). Waller and Walsh
(1996) examine the optimal term length in policy boards.
32As in the main model, we assume that the time horizon is certain and abstract from the possibility of
reappointment. If reappointment is possible, voting decisions may be also driven by the incentive to obtain
an additional mandate. In the FOMC, the presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks may be reappointed,
but not the members of the Board of Governors (except for the chairman and vice chairman). In the ECB,
the terms of o￿ce of the members of the Executive Board are not renewable.
[18]mainly due to the fact that when terms are staggered, some committee members (one in our
model) are at the end of their terms and, consequently, they do not care about the long-run
consequences of changing current policy.33 Overall, as in the original version of the model,
committees with staggered terms continue to deliver a gridlock interval in both states of
nature and choose policies di￿erent from ￿rst-best.
It is important to emphasize that the mechanism that gives rise to dynamic ine￿ciency
in this model is not speci￿c to the protocol employed. For instance, in related work, we
study a di￿erent voting procedure where the agenda is predetermined, rather than controlled
by the chairman (see Riboni and Ruge-Murcia, 2007b). More precisely, it is assumed that
in each meeting, the committee votes over incremental changes from the status quo. For
example, an increase of 25 basis points is initially put to a vote against the status quo. If it
passes, an increase of 50 basis points is voted against an increase of 25 basis points, and so
forth, until further increases are voted down. In order to capture the notion of consensus, it
is also assumed that a super-majority (that is, a majority larger than 50 percent plus one of
the votes) is required to pass a proposal. In states of disagreement, this protocol generates
a gridlock interval where the interest rate selected by the committee is simply the status
quo. As the size of the required super-majority increases, the gridlock interval expands and
inertia is more pronounced. Only when the status quo is su￿ciently extreme, compared
with the values preferred by most members, will the committee agree to change the status
quo. However, due to the super-majority requirement, the committee will not select the
median’s preferred policy and will reject further policy changes before it reaches the median’s
peak. This consensus-based protocol shows that the assumption that the chairman makes
take-it-or-leave-it o￿ers to the committee is not necessary to generate a gridlock interval in
states of disagreement. Moreover, in states of agreement, this protocol would also generate
dynamic ine￿ciency to the extent that members do not fully adjust the policy instrument.
The underlying reason being that a policy change in the current meeting determines, via the
endogenous status quo, which policy in the gridlock interval the committee will end up with
in case of future disagreement.
Finally, we want to make clear that this paper does not intend to play down the advan-
tages of policy making by committees. First, there might be other reasons that are not
captured in our model that make inertia in monetary policy decisions optimal.34 Overall,
33Recall from the discussion in Section 2.3 that as horizon becomes shorter the width of the gridlock
interval decreases. In a di￿erent set up, Waller (1992) shows instead that increasing term length decreases
the variance of policy decisions that is due to electoral uncertainty.
34Other explanations for partial adjustment include policy maker uncertainty (Orphanides, 2003), better
control over long-term interest rates (Goodfriend, 1991), and reduction of ￿nancial stress (Cukierman, 1991).
A status-quo bias could also arise from behavioral considerations. Experimental evidence and ￿eld studies
[19]it is then entirely possible that the additional policy inertia introduced by monetary policy
committees may provide a net bene￿t to society. Second, beside its implication in terms of
inertial behavior, group decision making has many desirable attributes. Previous literature
shows that committees can help overcome credibility problems. Sibert (2003) studies the
conditions under which committees have more incentives to build reputation than do indi-
vidual central bankers. In Dal B￿ o (2006), committee decision making under a supermajority
voting rule is able to deliver an ideal balance between commitment and ￿exibility. Second,
another body of literature sees information sharing as the main rationale for committee de-
cision making. This argument goes back to the celebrated Condorcet jury theorem. For
example, Gerlach-Kristen (2006) shows that in presence of uncertainty about potential out-
put, voting by committees leads to more e￿cient signal extraction. Experimental studies
by Blinder and Morgan (2000) and Lombardelli et al. (2005) provide some support for this
conclusion.
In summary, this paper models monetary policy making as a dynamic non-cooperative
game. Committee members sequentially decide the policy for the period after observing
the current realization of a preference shock. Depending on the shock, policy makers may
agree or disagree about the optimal monetary stance for the period. In this model, the
￿rst-best policy can be easily characterized: it satis￿es a risk-sharing condition in the states
of disagreement and prescribes the preferred policy of both agents in the states of agreement.
This paper shows that, in the absence of commitment, committee decision making does not
implement the ￿rst-best. Ine￿ciencies arise in all states of nature. In states of agreement,
policy makers do not choose the policy they both currently prefer, because they face a trade-
o￿ between the bene￿t of selecting their preferred policy in the current period and the cost of
reducing their bargaining power in the future. In states of disagreement, ine￿ciency is due
to incomplete risk-sharing between committee members. Stochastic simulations show that
committee decision making i) induces policy smoothing in the sense that the policy variable
changes less often than the state of nature and ii) endogenously generates autocorrelation
in interest rates. Finally, we analyze committee decision making with a ￿xed default and
show that this alternative arrangement removes the ine￿ciency in states of agreement by
eliminating the incentive to smooth bargaining power across states. However, compared to a
model with an endogenous default, a ￿xed default model delivers more ine￿cient risk-sharing
in the states of disagreement. This may be a probable reason why, despite the ine￿ciencies
described, policy making in practice often features an evolving default.
(e.g., Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1986) indicate that individuals disproportionately favor the status quo.
How these considerations play out in a collective decision-making context is a question that to our knowledge,
has not yet been addressed either theoretically or empirically in the literature.
[20]Table 1. Comparison of Voting Models
with Endogenous and Fixed Default
Fixed Single
Variable Endogenous 0 1=4 1=2 3=4 1 Banker
Matrix A
C’s mean payo￿ ￿0:85 ￿0:59 ￿1:23 ￿0:92 ￿0:17 0 0
P’s mean payo￿ ￿0:51 ￿0:92 ￿0:26 ￿0:59 ￿1:48 ￿1:99 ￿1:99
V ar(xt) 0:58 1:13 0:83 0:50 0:75 0:96 0:96
V ar(￿xt) 0:27 0:78 0:45 0:44 0:77 0:95 0:95
Matrix B
C’s mean payo￿ ￿0:68 ￿0:82 ￿1:00 ￿0:83 ￿0:17 0 0
P’s mean payo￿ ￿1:05 ￿0:83 ￿0:33 ￿0:82 ￿1:49 ￿1:99 ￿1:99
V ar(xt) 0:75 1:29 0:90 0:58 0:75 0:96 :96
V ar(￿xt) 0:88 1:82 1:27 0:82 1:05 1:35 1:35
Notes: The numbers in this Table were computed using 10000 simulations.
[21]A Proof of Proposition 1
We start by showing that GC;￿￿1(q￿￿1;"1) = q￿￿1 is the optimal proposal rule. Suppose that
the current shock is "1: The chairman’s proposal strategy at time ￿ ￿1 is found by exploiting
the fact that the successful proposal at time ￿ will be given by the proposal rules in Section
2.1. The chairman chooses the proposal x￿￿1 that maximizes his two-period payo￿ within
the acceptance set, A￿￿1(q￿￿1;"1). That is, he solves the problem
max
x￿￿12A￿￿1(q￿￿1;"1)






x￿￿1 2 [0;1] : ￿(1 + ￿p11)(x￿￿1)
2 ￿ ￿(1 + ￿p11)(q￿￿1)
2￿
:
It is easy to see that the acceptance set is [0;q￿￿1] for any q￿￿1 2 [0;1]. Since C’s two-period
payo￿ is increasing in the current proposal, the chairman always proposes x￿￿1 = q￿￿1.
Now we prove that the posited GC;￿￿1(q￿￿1;"2) is optimal. When "2 occurs at time ￿ ￿1;
the chairman’s problem becomes:
max
x￿￿12A￿￿1(q￿￿1;"2)
￿ (x￿￿1 ￿ 1=2)






x￿￿1 2 [0;1] : ￿(x￿￿1 ￿ 1=2)
2 ￿ ￿p12(x￿￿1)




In ￿nding GC;￿￿1(q￿￿1;"2), it is useful to ￿rst derive P’s voting rules. P’s two-period utility





Note that 0 < z < 1=2: Because the payo￿ is symmetric around z, the acceptance set
is easy to derive. For any q￿￿1 2 [0;z]; A￿￿1(q￿￿1;"2) = [q￿￿1;2z ￿ q￿￿1]; and for any
q￿￿1 2 [z;1]; A￿￿1(q￿￿1;"2) = [2z ￿ q￿￿1;q￿￿1]: Now consider C’s proposal strategy. C’s





Note that 1=2 < y < 1. When q￿￿1 2 [y;1]; C is not constrained and will propose y: When
q￿￿1 2 (2z ￿ y;y); C is constrained and proposes his preferred policy in the acceptance
set. We distinguish two cases: when q￿￿1 2 [z;y); the proposal is x￿￿1 = q￿￿1; and when
q￿￿1 2 (2z ￿ y;z), the proposal is x￿￿1 = 2z ￿ q￿￿1: Finally, when q￿￿1 2 [0;2z ￿ y]; the
acceptance set includes C’s bliss point y and, consequently, C proposes x￿￿1 = y: ￿
[22]B Committee with n+1 Members
Consider a committee composed of n + 1 members. Let n be odd and [x;x] denote the
policy space where policies take value. For a policy change, the chairman needs (n + 1)=2
favorable votes besides his own. Each member other than the chairman is indexed by j; with
j 2 N = f1;:::;ng. When "t = "1, members disagree in their preferred instrument values,
rj("1). We order the n members other than the chairman so that member 1 (n) is the one
with the smallest (largest) preferred value under shock "1, and r1("1) ￿ r2("1) ￿ ::: ￿ rn("1):
The median m is the one with index (n + 1)=2: When "t = "2, all members agree and
1=2 2 (x;x) is their preferred point. We assume that 1 and 0 are, respectively, the preferred
values of the chairman and the median, with x ￿ 0 < 1=2 < 1 ￿ x. As before, we assume












This requirement, which is stricter than sequential rationality when n ￿ 3, rules out equilibria
where players accept a proposal they do not like for the simple reason that a single rejection
does not a￿ect the voting outcome (see Baron and Kalai, 1993). The acceptance set is then
de￿ned as
At(qt;"
i) = fxt 2 [x;x] : jfj accepts xtgj ￿ (n + 1)=2g:
Denote by ri
t a policy at time t under the shock "i: Note that the proposal made by the
chairman concerns only the current period. However, in order to accept or reject the proposal,
members implicitly compare two sequences of policies, where future policies are derived by
using the proposal rules for subsequent periods.








s=t be two arbitrary policy sequences
specifying the instrument value for each state starting from an arbitrary t . The di￿erence
between the utilities associated with these two sequences is a monotone function of rj("1):
Proof: Without any loss of generality, suppose that the current shock is "1. Write the




















2 ￿ ￿p21(e r
2
s+1 ￿ 1=2)
2 + ::: ;





















2 ￿ ￿p21(b r
2
s+1 ￿ 1=2)
2 + ::: :
[23]Compute the derivative of the di￿erence of these two utilities with respect to rj("1) and note
that it does not depend on rj("1): Thus, the di￿erence in utility among any two sequences
is monotone in rj("1): ￿
From this lemma, we can prove the following proposition:
Proposition B1. A proposal is accepted if and only if it is accepted by the median.
Proof: Let GC;t(qt;"t) denote the proposal rule that all members expect from the chairman.
Notice that knowing GC;t(qt;"t), each member is able to foresee all the policies that the
committee will implement if the current proposal xt is passed. The utility associated to this
sequence is compared to the one obtained if the current status quo is kept for one more
period. Suppose that the median accepts proposal xt. Then, by Lemma B1, all committee
members that are either to the right or to the left of the median, m; also accept x: Therefore,
since m is the median, the proposal is passed. The \only if" part is equally straightforward.
By contradiction, suppose that the majority of members that accept a proposal does not
include the median. This clearly contradicts Lemma B1. ￿
Since the chairman only needs the approval of the median to pass a proposal and the prefer-
ences of the other members do not matter, then a committee with n+1 members is equivalent
to a two-person committee with the chairman and the median as the only policy makers.
[24]C Algorithm to Solve for Stationary Decision Rules
Step 1. Starting at time t = ￿, solve the chairman’s optimization problem for a set of discrete
nodes nj; for j = 1;2;::: ;N in [0;1]; given the shock "t = "i; for i = 1;2: The nodes nj
may be interpreted as possible status quo at the beginning of period ￿: Given nj and "i, the






subject to the nonlinear constraint UP(xt;"i) ￿ UP(nj;"i): This maximization problem
is solved numerically for each nj and "i using a hill-climbing method. The result is a
collection of 2N optimal proposal values GC;￿(nj;"i): Using these optimal values, compute
VC;￿(nj;"i) = UC(GC;￿(nj;"i);"i) and VP;￿(nj;"i) = UP(GC;￿(nj;"i);"i) for all nj and "i:
Step 2. For each "i; approximate the continuous value function VC;￿(q;"i) using a Chebyshev
polynomial of order N ￿1: The polynomial coe￿cients are obtained from the Least Squares
projection of VC;￿(nj;"i) on a constant and the ￿rst N ￿ 1 members of the Chebyshev
polynomial family. At the N nodes q = nj; the Chebyshev polynomial ￿ts VC;￿(q;"i)
exactly. For points q 6= nj; the value of VC;￿(q;"i) is computed by interpolation (i.e, by
evaluating the Chebyshev polynomial at q). For each "i; the value function VP;￿(q;"i) is
approximated likewise.
Step 3. Move backwards one period. For each possible status quo nj and each possible






















where the value functions are replaced by their respective approximating polynomials. The
result is a collection of 2N optimal proposal values GC;t(nj;"i): Using these optimal values,
compute VC;t(nj;"i) and VP;t(nj;"i) for all nj and "i:
Step 4. Repeat Steps 2 and 3 backwards until the chairman’s decision rules converge. ￿
[25]D Committee with Staggered Terms
Consider an in￿nite-horizon economy where the value of the policy instrument is selected
by a two-person committee with ￿nite and staggered terms. Under the assumptions spelled
out below, it is possible to obtain an analytical solution for the stationary decision rules.
Assume that the mandate of each member is two periods and it is not renewable. Committee
members are labeled as junior (senior) in the ￿rst (second) period of their mandate. The
senior member is assumed to be the chairman and, as in the model in the text, makes a
take-it-or-leave-it o￿er to the junior member. Members can be of two types: hawks or
doves, denoted by H and D, respectively. The period utility of member j = H;D is
Uj(xt;"t) = ￿(xt ￿ rj("t))
2;
where rj("t) denotes the preferred interest rate of individual j: Assume that the committee
always includes a member H and a member D. As before, there are two possible states of
the world: a state of agreement and a state of disagreement. When "t = "2, both members
agree that 1=2 is the optimal policy. When "t = "1, agents H and D disagree in their
preferred instrument values with rH("1) = 1 and rD("1) = 0: At the end of the mandate,
each member is replaced by an individual with the same preferences. At the initial time
t = 1, the committee is composed of a junior dove and a senior hawk. At time t = 2, the
committee includes a junior hawk and a senior dove; and so on. Denote by xH the proposal
that a senior hawk would make to a junior dove and by xD the proposal that a senior dove
would make to a junior hawk.
Note that the senior chooses the policy that maximizes his period utility because he
does not care about the next voting outcome. On the contrary, the junior member makes
his acceptance decision by taking into account its e￿ect on the next voting outcome. The


















Proposition C1 characterizes the equilibrium proposal rules.
Proposition C1: For all qt 2 [0;1] the stationary proposal rules when "1 and "2 occur are,







1=2; for qt 2 [0;2z ￿ 1=2] [ [1=2;1]; where z = (1=2)=(1 + ￿p12);
2z ￿ qt; for qt 2 (2z ￿ 1=2;z);








1=2; for qt 2 [0;1=2] [ [2y ￿ qt;1];where y = (1=2 + ￿p12)=(1 + ￿p12);
qt; for qt 2 (1=2;y);
2y ￿ qt; for qt 2 [y;2y ￿ qt]:
::
Proof: When "1 occurs, the period utility of senior H is increasing in xH and has a peak at
1. Taking as given the posited policy rules at period t + 1, the expected two-period utility

















Note that because of the non-monotonicity of GD(xH;"2); the second term is non-monotone
in xH; while the ￿rst and the third term are decreasing in xH. Overall, one can verify that the
expected life-time utility of junior D decreases in xH: This implies that the best acceptable
proposal for senior H is the status quo. This proves that GH(qt;"1) = qt: When "2 occurs,
the utility of the senior H is symmetric and has a peak at 1=2: The expected two-period


















One can verify that EuD(xH;"2) has a single peak in (1=2)=(1+￿p12) and it is symmetric in
the interval [0;1=2]: This implies that the chairman is able to propose his ideal point 1=2
whenever qt 2 [0;2z ￿ 1=2] [ [1=2;1] but can only propose the status quo when qt 2 [z;1=2]:
Thus, [z;1=2] is a gridlock interval. Proving that the posited proposal rule GD(qt;"t) is an
equilibrium strategy follows a parallel argument. ￿
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Figure 7: Stationary Policy Rules when Default is Fixed